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Abstract
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games
and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building
rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered paradoxical and undesirable. This problem is
discussed by many social and natural sciences. The paper discusses a simple model of sequential
game in which two players in each iteration of the game choose one of the two elements. They
make their decisions in different contexts defined by the rules of the game. It appears that the
optimal strategy of one of the players can only be intransitive! (the so-called relevant intransitive
strategies.) On the other hand, the optimal strategy for the second player can be either transitive
or intransitive. A quantum model of the game using pure one-qubit strategies is considered. In
this model, an increase in importance of intransitive strategies is observed – there is a certain
course of the game where intransitive strategies are the only optimal strategies for both players.
The study of decision-making models using quantum information theory tools may shed some
new light on the understanding of mechanisms that drive the formation of types of preferences.
1 Introduction
Games have always fascinated scholars, often contributing to the development of new theories [1].
In fact, the attempts to construct a systematic theory of rational behaviour are focused on games
as simple examples of human rationality. The attractiveness of such approach to the analysis the
interactions between rational players (a problem reflected in many fields of science) reveals itself
in its various applications [2]. Game theory methods have been used in areas such as military
science, biology, economics and other social sciences. Since the very beginning, the game theory
has been closely connected with the information theory [3]. Therefore, during the development of
the theory of quantum information [4], a quantum game theory has emerged in a natural way. In
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its general form, pure strategies are identified with Hilbert space vectors (pure states) — qubits or
qubit systems. Mixed strategies are represented by convex combinations of pure states. Replacing
classical probabilities used in the game theory with quantum probability amplitudes provides many
interesting opportunities arising from superposition and entanglement. The idea of constructing
quantum models of games is intensely developing nowdays. Numerous examples show the rapid rate
with which the situation of players changes after obtaining access to quantum technology and how the
fundamental limitations of classical models can be overcomed thanks to the properties of quantum
processes [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
This paper considers a simple model of a repeated game in which, at each stage, both players
divide between themselves a set consisting of three goods. With reference to the earlier results
[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] influenced by the remarks of Hugo Steinhaus [16], the players are referred
to as ’cats’ and goods are referred to as ’foods’. The main goal of our analysis is to examine how
rules of the game affect the type of optimal strategies for the players (whether they are transitive or
intransitive). The differences arising from the adoption of a different way of sourcing strategies are
also examined. One of them is a mixed strategy based on one bit (classical variant) and the other is
one-qubit pure state (quantum variant).
Before we proceed to the formal description of the game, let us highlight the main ideas of
transitivity — intransitivity. This is done in the next subsection. The second subsection of this
introduction is devoted to review of recent results that have led us to formulate the main results.
1.1 Intransitivity
Any relation  between the elements of a certain set is called transitive if
A  B ∧B  C ⇒ A  C. (1)
is fulfilled for any three elements A, B, C. If this condition is not fulfilled then the relation will be
called intransitive (not transitive).
The problem of transitivity (intransitivity) stems from various fields of research. There is an
opinion that people who make decisions relying on rational reasoning, should make decisions in de-
termined and linear order [17, 18]. Transitivity of preferences indicates the way of choosing according
to the “logical order”. There is also a hypothesis that many animals (also people) follow transitive
inference rules (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better
than C ). This type of reasoning has been confirmed in several animal species [19].
One of the main arguments against intransitiveness is the so-called “money pump” [20]. On the
other hand, some modification of utility theory and decision theory which dispense of the transitivity
assumption have been considered [21, 22].
The beginnings of research on intransitive orders probably dates back to 1785 when Jean Con-
dorcet published his work: Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Deci-
sions (1785), in which he analyzed the paradox of voting. He concluded that collective preferences
can be intransitive even if the preferences of individual voters are not. Analysis of this paradox led
Kenneth Arrow (Nobel Prize winner in economy) to prove that an election procedure which would
perfectly agree with basic postulates of democracy does not exist [23].
In psychology, which also attempts to explain, inter alia, the decision making process, the special
interest is focused on a broadly understood relation of superiority or domination (preference) [24, 25].
Does the fact that A dominates over B and B dominates over C, imply that A dominates over C?
It turns out that the answer is not obvious and depends on a particular situation. The discussion
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on the concept of dominance has also continued using the tools provided by exact sciences with
probabilistic models as good examples, e.g. Efron’s Dice [26]. The game proposed by Walter Penney
[27] is another example of intransitivity in probabilistic models. Intransitivity may explain the
processes occurring in Nature. Rivalry between species may be intransitive. For example, in the case
of fungi, Phallus impudicus replaced Megacollybia platyphylla, M. platyphylla replaced Psathyrella
hydrophilum, but P. hydrophilum replaced P. impudicus [28]. Similarly, we can explain the stability of
the population of lizards [29] or experiments with bees which make intransitive choices between flowers
[30]. Intransitivity models appear also in many seemingly distant sciences including philosophy [17],
operations research [31], thermodynamics [32], quantum theory [12], logic [33].
Research on the rational decision-making process is complex and consists of many various con-
cepts. There is a large literature with the discussions on rational choice [34]. This is a difficult
problem because it turns out that the assumptions made by theoretician (such as completeness,
transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives or others) are often broken in the course of ex-
periments with humans. Thus, people have constructed theories of choice without transitivity or
other assumptions. In this paper we focus on one of the most important issues in the theory of deci-
sion — the transitivity/intransitivity of the choice. Reflections on this occurs in the context of studies
of various types of preferences, state-dependent preferences [35], context-dependent preferences [36].
Intransitive issue is still not well understood. It is worth to study this using tools of quantum
game theory. This new look can lead to many interesting conclusions that can be used in research
on decision-making process simulation and other biological mechanisms.
1.2 Earlier results. “I cut, you choose” game.
In his diary, Hugo Steinhaus mentions Pitts experiments with cats. It turns out that that the cat,
facing the choice between fish, meat and milk prefers fish to meat, meat to milk, and milk to fish!
Steinhaus thought that the cat provided itself with a balanced diet, thanks to the above-mentioned
food preferences. This is one of the key factors needed to maintain good health. Hence, in our model
of the game, the players are cats choosing among foods. Obviously, this is only an illustration of the
problem which can be interpreted in different ways (e.g. in relation to other goods, or as an electoral
issue).
In the paper [10] was considered a classic model of a game in which the player (cat) are offered
three types of foods, every time in pairs of two types. Optimal strategy was defined as one that leads
to a balanced diet (equal distribution of the frequency of the occurrence of a particular food in cat’s
diet). The offering player (Nature) was not interested in the result of the game. The quantitative
analysis of various types (intransitiv or transitive) optimal strategies indicated the advantage of the
transitive strategies. Intransitive strategies represent a significant part of all optimal strategies, but
in the situation that favors optimal strategies we can always find the strategy that determines the
transitive order (with identical result, under the same conditions). This situation changed in the
quantum variant of the game [11], which reveals the existence of the so-called relevant intransitive
strategies, defined as follows [14]:
Definition 1 The intransitive strategy will be called the relevant strategy, if there is no transitive
strategy of the same consequences with the same assumption.
In the paper [14] was considered electoral interpretation of the game (see also [38]). The decrease of
importance of intransitive orders which accompanies the growth of support for one of the candidates
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1 turned out to be an interesting property of the quantum game model. The use of an entangled
state to the model construction causes an increase in the importance of transitive strategies.
It turns out that intransitive relevant strategies are not only characteristic of quantum models.
In the paper [15] offering player (Nature) has been replaced by a rational player. In this game both
players (Cat 1 and Cat 2) divide the set of three foods according to the ”I cut, you choose” method
[39, 40] (see Fig.1). The first player, chooses and rejects one of the foods. Then the second player,
selects and consumes one of the remaining two foods. The first player eats the food that is left. The
optimum consists (as in previous models) in not distinguishing any of the three foods. Each of the
foods is equally important to each of the players.
START
READ cat1 ∈ {0, 1, 2}CAT1 MOVE
cat1 → p
SHOW p
READ cat2 ∈ {0, 1}CAT2 MOVE
p+ cat2 + 1mod 3→ p
p→ cat2
3− cat1 − cat2 → cat1
SHOW cat1, cat2
GAME OVER
Figure 1: Each iteration of the game. Symbol textsl mod n is the remainder of
the division by n. Older and younger cat – respectively cat1 i cat2.
1
Figure 1: Flow diagram of each iteration of the ’I cut, you choose’ game.
In this variant of the game, only the second player (Cat 2) makes choices between the pairs of
foods offered to him. Therefore, transitive and intransitive strategies can be analysed only in case of
this player. It appears that his optimal strategies are only intransitive strategies (relevant intransitive
strategies.).
In this article, a modification of the above game is analysed. It consists in letting the player
choose the food selected at the first stage of the game, as well as the food rejected by the other
player. This modification allows both players to determine their preferences with regard to the pairs
of foods. It will enable exploring the types of strategies and their availability for individual players.
1If voters start to clearly prefer one of the candidates.
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2 Classical model
The two players(Cat 1 i Cat 2 ) are offered three foods: food number 0, food number 1, food number
2, always in pairs of two, in accordance with the following procedure. The first player (Cat 1 ) selects
and keeps one of the three foods. The second player (Cat 2 ) chooses between the two remaining
foods. The food kept in the first move and the food rejected by Cat 2 now form a pair from which a
selection is made by Cat 1 (2nd move) . Diagram of the game is shown in Figure 2.
START
READ p ∈ {0, 1, 2}CAT1 1st MOVE
SHOW p
READ cat2 ∈ {0, 1}CAT2 MOVE
cat2 + p+ 1mod 3→ p
SHOW p
READ cat1 ∈ {0, 1}CAT1 2nd MOVE
cat1 + p+ 1mod 3→ cat1
p→ cat2
SHOW cat1, cat2
GAME OVER
Figure 2: Flow diagram of each iteration of of the game.
The optimal behaviour of the players is not to favour any of the three foods (each being equally
attractive and important). Both participants try to achieve a balanced diet. This assumption
allows to extract meaning of intransitive orders, because all the elements that we sort of are equally
important.
2.1 Mathematical description
The first move of Cat 1 is limited to select one of the three food. This movement can be described
by the point (P0, P1, P2) of a three dimensional simplex, where Pj denotes the frequency of the choice
of food numbered by j. Let us denote by P (Ck|Bj) the probability of choosing (by the Cat 2) food
number k when the offered pair of dishes does not contain food number j. Analogously, number
Q(Ck|Bj) denotes the probability of choosing by the Cat 1 food number k when the offered pair
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of dishes does not contain food number j.2 Six conditional probabilities P (Ck|Bj) (or Q(Ck|Bj))
determine the behaviour of the players with respect to the proposed them in pairs food portions.
Let λk and ωk denot the frequencies of appearance of the particular foods in the Cat 1 and the
Cat 2 diet, respectively.
For Cat 2 we obtain:
ω0 = P (C0|B1)P1 + P (C0|B2)P2,
ω1 = P (C1|B0)P0 + P (C1|B2)P2, (2)
ω2 = P (C2|B0)P0 + P (C2|B1)P1.
From the perspective of the Cat 1 :
λ0 = Q(C0|B1)[P (C1|B0)P0 + P (C1|B2)P2] +Q(C0|B2)[P (C2|B0)P0 + P (C2|B1)P1],
λ1 = Q(C1|B2)[P (C2|B0)P0 + P (C2|B1)P1] +Q(C1|B0)[P (C0|B1)P1 + P (C0|B2)P2], (3)
λ2 = Q(C2|B1)[P (C1|B0)P0 + P (C1|B2)P2] +Q(C2|B0)[P (C0|B1)P1 + P (C0|B2)P2].
Let us introduce the parameterization of the conditional probabilities.
Let us assume:
P (C2|B0) = 1 + l0
2
, P (C1|B0) = 1− l0
2
,
P (C0|B1) = 1 + l1
2
, P (C2|B1) = 1− l1
2
, (4)
P (C1|B2) = 1 + l2
2
, P (C0|B2) = 1− l2
2
.
and
Q(C2|B0) = 1− L0
2
, Q(C1|B0) = 1 + L0
2
,
Q(C0|B1) = 1− L1
2
, Q(C2|B1) = 1 + L1
2
, (5)
Q(C1|B2) = 1− L2
2
, Q(C0|B2) = 1 + L2
2
.
2.2 Optimal strategies
The optimal strategy for the two players is to get the equal distribution of frequency of the occurrence
of a particular food in diet. It is required that the following conditions are held:
λ0 = λ1 = λ2 =
1
3
, (6)
ω0 = ω1 = ω2 =
1
3
. (7)
The (7) condition takes the form:
2We refer here to the players mixed strategies, as pure strategies do not lead to optimal results.
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l1P1 − l2P2 = 2
3
− (P1 + P2),
l2P2 − l0P0 = 2
3
− (P0 + P2), (8)
l1P1 − l3P3 = 2
3
− (P0 + P3) ,
and its solution:
P0 =
−(−1− l1 + l2 − 3 l1l2)
3(1 + l0l1 + l0l2 + l1l2)
,
P1 =
−(−1 + l0 − l2 − 3 l0l2)
3(1 + l0l1 + l0l2 + l1l2)
, (9)
P2 =
−(−1− l0 + l1 − 3 l0l1)
3(1 + l0l1 + l0l2 + l1l2)
,
defines a mapping of the three-dimensional cube [−1, 1]3 in the space of parameters lj (that de-
fine conditional probabilities P (Ck|Bj)) into a triangle–two-dimensional simplex. The barycentric
coordinates of a point of this triangle are interpreted as the probabilities (P0, P1, P2).
Note that Cat 2 is able to achieve the optimum effect (7) if for every j (j = 0, 1, 2) the condition
Pj ≤ 23 is satisfied. Indeed, if P0 > 23 then P1 + P2 < 13 and ω0 < 13 (similarly in other cases). Let us
now consider the situation of (Cat 1 ). This player moves first in each iteration of the game. The (6)
condition can be written as follows:
(1− L1)(1− l0)P0 + (1 + L2)(1 + l0)P0 + (1 + L2)(1− l1)P1 + (1− L1)(1 + l2)P2 = 4/3,
(1− L2)(1 + l0)P0 + (1 + L0)(1 + l1)P1 + (1− L2)(1− l1)P1 + (1 + L0)(1− l2)P2 = 4/3, (10)
(1 + L1)(1− l0)P0 + (1− L0)(1 + l1)P1 + (1− L0)(1− l2)P2 + (1 + L1)(1 + l2)P2 = 4/3 ,
Let us suppose there are exist 3 parameters li such that condition (7) is satisfied – Cat 2 reaches the
diet completeness.
Substituting formula (9) on the probability Pj into formula (10) immediately gives
L1 = L2,
L0 = L2, (11)
L0 = L1.
These conditions describe a set of Cat’s 1 optimal strategy. This player must use strategy charac-
terized by three (independent) equal conditional probabilities.
In the next section we analyze the optimal strategies for both players in terms of their division
into two types - intransitive and transitive.
3 Optimal intransitive and transitive strategies
We say that a player prefers food no. 1 to food no. 0 (1  0) when he/she is willing to choose food
no. 1 more often than food no. 0 from the offered pair (0, 1) (P (C1|B2) > P (C0|B2)). The situation
corresponds to an intransitive choice if one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
3If Pj ≤ 23 for any j.
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1. P (C0|B2) < P (C1|B2), P (C1|B0) < P (C2|B0), P (C2|B1) < P (C0|B1) ,
2. P (C0|B2) > P (C1|B2), P (C1|B0) > P (C2|B0), P (C2|B1) > P (C0|B1) .
These two conditions can be written (by using normalization probability measure to 1) in the following
form:
P (C0|B2) < 1
2
, P (C1|B0) < 1
2
, P (C2|B1) < 1
2
, (12)
P (C0|B2) > 1
2
, P (C1|B0) > 1
2
, P (C2|B1) > 1
2
. (13)
Let’s see how different types of strategies of individual players are achievable. The conditions
under which Cat 2 makes his decision are similar to those considered in the work [10] (then it was a
game with Nature). This player can select its optimal strategy if only Pj ≤ 23 , for j = 0, 1, 2. It turns
out that under this assumption, this strategy can always be transitive, but not always intransitive.
This can be illustrated graphically. Figure 3 presents the areas of frequency (P0, P1, P2) for which Cat
2 optimal strategies exist. It is the range (for 10,000 randomly selected points) of mapping (defined
by equations (9) ) of the three-dimensional cube of parameters tj into a triangle (P0, P1, P2).
Figure 3: Availability (by Cat 2 ) of different types of strategies. From left to right: all, transitive,
intransitive.
Probabilities (P0, P1, P2), for which Cat 2 can identify the optimal intransitive strategy, form a six-
armed star composed of two triangles (any of them corresponding to one of two possible intransitive
orders). Both the optimal strategies of any type and optimal transitive strategies correspond to
regular hexagon specified by conditions Pj ≤ 23 , j = 0, 1, 2.
The other player (Cat 1 ) situation is completely different. Cat 1 selects at the final stage of each
iteration of the game. This movement reveals his preference for one food over another from pair.
As pointed out above, Cat 1 optimal strategies (assuming that the second player reaches the
optimal strategy) satisfy the condition (11), therefore:
Q(C0|B2) = Q(C1|B0) = Q(C2|B1). (14)
This means that either (12) or (13) is satisfied. It means that Cat 1 has to make intransitive choices
in order to achieve the optimal result!
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4 Quantum cats
4.1 One-qubit pure strategies
In this section we use different method of obtaining conditional probabilities (provided by the quan-
tum games theory) which describe the preferences of decision makers,Cat 1 and Cat 2, over pairs
of food. This method was first used in the work [11] and is based on the concept of the so-called
mutually unbiased:
Definition 2 Two orthonormal bases A ≡ { |ψ0〉 . . . |ψN−1〉} and B ≡ { |ϕ0〉 . . . |ϕN−1〉} in Hilbert
space CN are mutually unbiased if
|〈ψi|ϕj〉|2 = 1
N
,
for any 0 ≤ i, j ≤ N − 1.
For two-dimensional Hilbert space, three mutually unbiased bases is given as follows
{|0〉, |1〉} ,{ |0〉+ |1〉√
2
,
|0〉 − |1〉√
2
}
, (15){ |0〉+ i|1〉√
2
,
|0〉 − i|1〉√
2
}
.
This set is the most important for our considerations. It is worth to mention here that mutually
unbiased bases led Wiesner [41] to begin research into quantum cryptography, before asymmetric
key cryptography was invented! These bases play also an important role in universality of quantum
market games [42, 43, 44].
Let us turn to the construction of conditional probabilities that define the strategy of the players.
Let us denote three different mutually unbiased bases of two-dimensional Hilbert space as
{|1〉0, |2〉0}, {|0〉1, |2〉1}, {|0〉2, |1〉2} = {(1, 0)T , (0, 1)T}
Strategy of choosing the food number k, when the offered food pair not contain the food of number
l is denoted by |k〉l (k, l = 0, 1, 2 i k 6= l).
A family {|z〉} (z ∈ C) of convex vectors:
|z〉 := |0〉2 + z|1〉2 = |0〉1 + 1− z
1 + z
|2〉1 = |1〉0 + 1 + iz
1− iz |2〉0,
defined by the parameters of the heterogeneous coordinates of the projective space CP 1, represents
all strategies spanned by the base vectors.
The coordinates of the same strategy |z〉 read (measured) in three different bases (15) define
quantum cats preferences toward a food pair represented by the base vectors. Squares of their
moduli, after normalization, measure the conditional probability of quantum catŠs making decision
in choosing a particular product, when the choice is related to the suggested food pair. Diagram
of the quantum variant of game is shown in Figure 4. It is similar to the previous one 2, since the
difference lies only in the process of implementing the game.
The player (Cat 1 or Cat 2 in our game) makes a decision to choose the right food from pair
with the following probabilities:
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START
READ base ∈ {0, 1, 2}CAT1 1st MOVE
SHOW base
READ cat2 ∈ {0, 1} IN baseCAT2 MOVE
cat2 + base+ 1mod 3→ base
SHOW base
READ cat1 ∈ {0, 1} IN baseCAT1 2nd MOVE
cat1 + base+ 1mod 3→ cat1
base→ cat2
SHOW cat1, cat2
GAME OVER
Figure 4: Flow diagram of each iteration of the quantum variant of game.
P (C0|B2) = 1
1 + |z|2 , P (C1|B2) =
|z|2
1 + |z|2 ,
P (C0|B1) = 1
1 + |1−z
1+z
|2 , P (C2|B1) =
|1−z
1+z
|2
1 + |1−z
1+z
|2 , (16)
P (C1|B0) = 1
1 + |1+iz
1−iz |2
, P (C2|B0) =
|1+iz
1−iz |2
1 + |1+iz
1−iz |2
.
It is convenient to parameterized |z〉 by the sphere S2 w C by using stereographic projection which
establishes bijection between elements of C and the points of S2.
The conditional probabilities can now be written in the following form:
P (C0|B2) = 1− x3
2
, P (C1|B2) = 1 + x3
2
,
P (C0|B1) = 1 + x1
2
, P (C2|B1) = 1− x1
2
, (17)
P (C1|B0) = 1 + x2
2
, P (C2|B0) = 1− x2
2
.
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Note that the probability (17) are parameterized similarly to the classic model. But in this case
we have a sphere points, so the condition x21 + x22 + x23 = 1 must be fulfilled.
A careful reader certainly noticed that we abstained from introducing to much of the game-
theoretical terminology. The problem can be easily reformulated in the language of quantum game
theory [7, 8]. Another interesting approach would be to adopt the framework developed by A. Lambert-
Mogiliansky, I. Martinez-Martinez [45], c.f. also [46]. This framework allows one to incorporate type
indeterminacy of agents [45, 47, 48]. In our model the agents are of definite type.
4.2 Availability of different types of one-qubit strategies
Availability of various types of Cat 2 ’s one-qubit optimal strategies is illustrated in Figure 5 (see
[11]). Here we see a fundamental contrast between quantum and classical model. First of all, the
Figure 5: Availability (by Cat 2 ) of different types of one-qubit strategies. From left to right: all,
transitive, intransitive.
area corresponding to the optimal transitive strategies does not cover the entire area of the optimal
strategy of any type (transitiv or intransitiv). Transitive optimal strategies do not appear within the
boundaries of hexagon-like figure in the central part of the triangle.
This means that for some frequencies (P0, P1, P2) Cat 2 is able to achieve optimal results only
thanks to the intransitive strategy! 4
Let’s analyze the Cat 1 situation in the case of one-qubit pure strategy, at the final stage of each
iteration of the game. The probabilities Q(Ck|Bj) are in the form (17). To distinguish it from the
strategy of the other player instead of xi, we will use Xi.
Assuming the Cat 2 achieves the optimal strategy, the optimality conditions (8) for Cat 1 will
simplify to:
X1 −X3 = 0,
X2 +X3 = 0, (18)
X1 +X2 = 0.
Since X21 + X22 + X23 = 1 we obtain two optimal strategies that are characterized by two points
4Detailed quantitative analysis of second player’s optimal strategies (Fig. 3 and 5) is similar to that in work [11].
Readers interested in this, please refer to this paper.
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(X1, X2, X3) of two-dimensional sphere:
X1 = − 1√
3
, X2 =
1√
3
, X3 = − 1√
3
,
X1 =
1√
3
, X2 = − 1√
3
, X3 =
1√
3
.
Both of these strategies are intransitive.
It is worth noting that in the language of quantum game theory one-qubit strategies are pure
strategies, have an equal informative values (the zero entropy). Hence, treating them in an equal way
is natural and does not raise any controversy similar of those of the constant measure (the Laplace’s
principle of insufficient reason) in the classical model. In this case, we used a mixed strategies which
may provide different pieces of information. Pure strategies that we can identify with eight choice
functions:
fk : {(0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 2)} → {0, 1, 2}, k = 0, . . . , 7,
do not lead us to identify the optimal strategy.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The variant of the game considered in the paper allows to explore the availability of different types
of optimal strategies of both players (as opposed to earlier models which related to the situation
of one player only). They make their decisions in a variety of contexts (depending on the decision
made by the other player), which affects their possibility to use optimal intransitive and transitive
strategies. The most interesting variant of the game has been analysed, i.e. such variant where the
circumstances provide both players with the opportunity to achieve their optimal strategies.
It appears that the only optimal strategies of Cat 1 are intransitive strategies. This is indeed an
interesting result. This player performs two moves in the game. In the first one, he chooses (with
frequency Pj) one of the foods. The food is included in the pair from which he makes the final
selection. Therefore, he has a partial influence on the composition of this pair5 It might seem that
such a possibility should help him achieve an optimal strategy in the sense that he has more freedom
in choosing the type of strategy. However, it is quite the opposite; he can only use an intransitive
strategy. The other player (Cat 2 ) in the classical variant of the game can always use a transitive
strategy (in certain specific conditions also intransitive strategy, see Fig. 3).
Replacing classical strategies of the players with one-qubit quantum strategies will increase the
importance of intransitive strategies. At certain (P0, P1, P2) frequencies, in order to achieve an
optimal effect, both players must apply intransitive strategies! Moreover, the one-qubit strategies
are pure strategies – have an equal mathematical and information status (in contrast to the mixed
strategies in classical model).
The model discussed in the paper, despite its mathematical simplicity, clearly illustrates how the
type of preferences depends on the context of the decision to be made and on the behaviour of other
players. The rejection of intransitive strategies as undesirable strategies is an unnecessary limitation.
A distinction between intransitive and transitive strategies does not necessarily mean a distinction
between irrational and rational strategies. However, it may well describe the decision-making process
from an entirely different point of view – the context of choice (e.g. whether and how the freedom of
5Cat 2 does not have this possibility .
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choice with regard to the decisions we take is affected by the adopted rules or the behaviour of other
players).
It is worth mentioning that at present we can observe rapidly growing literature where ideas of
Quantum Mechanics are proposed to explain a problems of behavioral and social science [49, 50, 51,
52, 53, 54]. The formalism of quantum mechanics can be useful in providing explanation to violations
of transitivity in decision-making process (see [46]). We are still not fully aware of the implications
of quantum theory in computer science models, machine learning and especially in decision-making.
The work that has been done in this field indicates significant progress in the development this part
of our knowledge.
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